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Abstract. We present the first automated privacy analysis of STAR-
Vote, a real world voting system design with sophisticated “end-to-end”
cryptography, using FDR and ProVerif. We also evaluate the effective-
ness of these tools. Despite the complexity of the voting system, we were
able to verify that our abstracted formal model of STAR-Vote provides
ballot-secrecy using both formal approaches. Notably, ProVerif is radi-
cally faster than FDR, making it more suitable for rapid iteration and
refinement of the formal model.
Keywords: Security protocols, Formal methods, Privacy, E-voting, STAR-
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1 Introduction
Security systems employ protocols to ensure their desired goals over a hostile
network such as that the communication between agents is authenticated and/or
the information that needs to be confidential is indeed confidential. They also
aim to provide integrity, key distribution, non-repudiation, and other such prop-
erties. However, they are always a target for some malicious activity. Moreover,
as the complexity of security-critical systems has grown, rigorous verification and
secure implementation gains importance. In our case, cryptographic voting sys-
tems have multiple actors exchanging messages, to achieve a variety of important
goals, requiring a careful system analysis to ensure there isn’t a subtle problem.
Formal methods has been shown to be a well suited methodology for analysis
of cryptographic protocols, including famous results such as Lowe’s attack [19]
on the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol (NSPK) [23]. Since then, formal
methodologies have been applied in the analysis of a variety of cryptographic
protocols, and also for electronic voting systems, using automated tools includ-
ing FDR [21, 22], ProVerif [2, 13, 24], Active Knowledge in Security Protocols
(AKISS) [7], AVISPA [1], TA4SL [6] and Scyther [10].
Formal methods and their tools differ in their approaches to reasoning (e.g.,
BAN logic, theorem proving, or attack construction). However, all require the
user to hold a deep understanding of how these tools work in order to reason
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about a system and its specification. Even to an experienced user, these tools
raise a variety of challenges. Every tool differs in its expressiveness: the capabil-
ity of a formal language while modeling protocols to capture their specifications.
For example, some tools may not support automation of complex cryptographic
primitives such as homomorphic encryption, as used by many voting schemes.
Secondly, all model checking tools suffer from the general problem of state space
explosion. Unlike toy security protocols, with only a few messages exchanged,
analyzing complex security protocols can require computation exponential in
the size of the protocol, exhausting finite computational resources, much less
the patience of the user. Furthermore, some verifiers will cap the number of
simultaneous adversaries or concurrent runs of the protocol, reducing the com-
putational complexity but also possibly missing real-world vulnerabilities. Lastly,
usability of the tools is very crucial. Some tools might merely say that a protocol
is “correct” without offering a proof. Others might offer a counter-example to
demonstrate a vulnerability, but that counter-example might require significant
human effort to consider whether it applies or not to the “real” protocol.
In this article, we investigate the challenges in engineering automated analysis
of complex security protocols, and evaluate FDR and ProVerif protocol verifiers
through modeling and analysis of the STAR-Vote [4] voting system with re-
spect to ballot-secrecy requirement. We have chosen these two verifiers as these
tools are mature, widely accepted, and have been previously used for analysis of
comparable systems.
STAR-Vote Overview STAR-Vote [4] is a DRE-style electronic voting system,
using human-readable paper and encrypted electronic records. STAR-Vote sup-
ports homomorphic tallying of votes and non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK)
proofs that ballots are well-formed. Voters have a receipt to verify their votes
are counted-as-cast by visiting a block-chain “public bulletin board” structure.
Similarly, voters can challenge machines to prove that any given encrypted vote
is an accurate record of their intent [3], but challenged votes are not counted in
the tally. STAR-Vote was designed around the requirements of Travis County
(Austin), Texas by a collaboration between academics and the county elections
staff. A variety of different cryptographic primitives are specified, including ho-
momorphic encryption, NIZK proofs, and hash chains. Some important messages
are passed on paper while others are passed electronically. STAR-Vote includes
a controller operated by poll workers, multiple voting terminals operated by vot-
ers, and a ballot box which queries these machines before it will accept any given
printed ballot. Needless to say, STAR-Vote is a perfect example of a complex
security protocol, and it’s valuable to apply formal modeling tools to understand
its correctness.
From the voter’s perspective, all of this complexity is hidden. Figure 1 shows
a schematic diagram of the STAR-Vote system. An eligible voter goes to a polling
station, authenticates to the election official and gets a 1D barcode encoding the
voter’s precinct and ballot style. This might involve an online database in cases
where voters can go to multiple voting centers. STAR-Vote maintains an airgap
between the voter registration database and the voting system, with the only
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Fig. 1. A schematic diagram of STAR-Vote
data that crosses the boundary being the short barcode. The voter then presents
the barcode to a poll worker at the controller machine, who scans it to learn the
voter’s correct precinct and ballot style, and then prints a 5-digit unique code
(also called a pin or token). The voter then carries this code to any open voting
terminal and is presented with their proper ballot. When complete, the terminal
prints a human-readable summary of the voter’s choices, which the voter is to
deposit in a ballot box, along with a receipt, which the voter can take home.
This receipt corresponds to a hash of the ciphertext of the voter’s selections
which should also later appear on the web bulletin board (hereafter, “wbb”).
The ballot box will refuse to accept anything other than a valid ballot, based on
random ballot IDs printed on the ballot and verified with the networked voting
machines, thus preventing some ballot stuffing attacks. A voter who recognizes
a mistake on the printed ballot can also choose to “spoil” that ballot by taking
it to the controller rather than depositing it.
Needless to say, modeling the paper and electronic flow of messages in STAR-
Vote is a complex task. Figure 2 illustrates a simplified STAR-Vote voting proce-
dure capturing cryptographic message flow on the network. We will discuss the
meanings of the relevant messages in the protocol as they arise in our analysis,
but even to a quick glance, STAR-Vote is sufficiently complicated that we would
expect to find challenges in its verification.
2 STAR-Vote in Communicating Sequential Processes
and FDR
The STAR-Vote Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) model is explained
in the followings 1.
2.1 STAR-Vote CSP Model
Our STAR-Vote CSP model consists of five processes running in parallel: a
controller process that controls the internal network, a voter process, a ballot
marking device (voting terminal) process, an electronic ballot box process that
can scan barcodes and sends scanned ballot cast ids to the controller, and a
1 the complete machine readable CSP model is provided at https://muratmoran.com/
publications/
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id, C
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pkT , pkC , zp0, zi0
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Ballot Box
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check token
v
choose bcid, bid, r1, r2, r3
cbcid = penc(bcid, r1, pkC)
cbid = penc(bid, r2, pkT )
cv = penc(v, r3, pkT )
p = (pkC , r3, v, cv)
zpi = hash(cv, p, zpi−1)
zii = hash(cbcid, cv, p, cbid, zii−1)
mid, t, bst, cbcid, cbid, cv, zpi, zii
v, bid, bcid, zpi
spoil - audit
v, bid, bcid
bcid
check bcid
cv, p, zpi
Homomorphic tallying
Fig. 2. A Simplified STAR-Vote voting procedure, where pkC is controller’s and pkT is
trustee’s public key, bid and bcid are the ballot and ballot cast identifiers respectively,
r, zp0, and zi0 are random seeds, and mid is voting terminal id.
wbb process. Each CSP process has been modeled in a way that they all behave
honestly and follow the process flow. As an example, the honest voter process
behavior is modeled as the following:
Voter(id) =̂
u
c∈C
©­­­­­­­­«
choose.id.c→
scomm.id.Term.c→
2
bid:=Bids
bcid:=Bcids
h:=Hashchains
©­­­«
scomm.Term.id?(c, bid, bcid) →
nbcomm.Term.id?h→
scomm.id.Box.Term.(c, bid, bcid) →
closeElection→ STOP
ª®®®¬
ª®®®®®®®®¬
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where id is the voter identity; c is the candidate; Term is the voting terminal;
Box is the ballot box process; bid is the ballot identifier; and bcid is the ballot
cast identifier.
When defining processes and messages as in the voter process above, we need
two different kinds of channel types; secret scomm and public comm channels
in order to maintain the secrecy of security-sensitive information. The STAR-
Vote voting system model is then described by the parallel composition of the
processes that synchronize on common events as the following:
System =̂Voters ‖ Box ‖ Controller ‖ Terminal ‖ Wbb
Modeling Assumptions In symbolic model checking, it is assumed that cryp-
tographic primitives work perfectly. Hence, the system attacks that may be
caused by cryptographic algorithms are not covered in our modeling. We treat
cryptographic primitives as symbolic operations with the appropriate algebraic
properties, such as; public key encryption: Epk (m) and digital signatures: Ssk (m).
Hence, an asymmetrically encrypted message can only be retrieved with the
corresponding secret key.
Specifically for our CSP STAR-Vote model, the model consists of a limited
number of honest agents (2 or 3 simultaneous voters, 2 candidates on the ballot).
We could modify the model with an increased number of voters, candidates,
voting terminals and precincts, but each would require a lot more space in the
state base of FDR. Moreover, we assume that the voter chooses the candidate
that she would like to vote for before the election begins. This allows us to
eliminate false positive attacks. Additionally, the voter verification part of the
system is omitted, where the voter can spoil and audit encrypted votes, and can
check if her receipt appears on the public bulletin board as we focus on solely
voter privacy. Furthermore, the real voting system relies on the hash chains of
the encrypted votes, which is simplified and modeled as the hash of an encrypted
vote and a nonce provided by the authorities. In terms of randomness in choosing
nonce-like terms, such as ballot ids and ballot cast ids, randomness is modeled as
the non-deterministic choice of terms over a pre-determined set of terms. STAR-
Vote employs a threshold mechanism for creating trustee’s public key pairs and
decryption of homomorphically multiplied ciphertexts. We model this simply
as the public key pairs and asymmetric decryption of a ciphertext respectively.
Lastly, encrypted votes are submitted and publicized on the wbb along with non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs, which ensures that ballots are well-formed.
However, we further assume that all ciphertexts and ballot forms are well-formed.
Intruder Model In our analysis, we employed an active Dolev-Yao intruder [14]
model in CSP, as adapted to voting systems in Moran and Heather [21]. The
intruder model supports active intruder behavior: interacting with the protocol
participants, overhearing communication channels, intercepting and spoofing any
messages that the intruder has learned or generated from its prior knowledge. In
this model, intruder processes have a set of deductions rules in order to compose
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and decompose messages, and a set Ucomms, as below, defining the unreliable
channels on which the intruder can act. For instance, the following rules enable
intruders to have access to any channels from and to the voter v1, where the set
comms is the union of all communication channels.
Ucomms = ⋃({q.q′. f | q.q′. f ← comms, q← {v1 }, q ′← agents},
{q.q′. f | q.q′. f ← comms, q← agents, q′← {v1 }})
The system that will be analyzed is the parallel composition of the renamed
voting system model System, which enables the messages flowing on unreliable
channel to be taken or eavesdropped, and the intruder model Intruder. The
resulting composition System ‖ Intruder synchronizes on their common events.
In the following section, we will define several sets like Ucomms for different
intruder capabilities.
2.2 Analysis with FDR
In this section, we present the first automated analysis of STAR-Vote under an
active Dolev-Yao intruder model and the anonymity specification given in [22].
Accordingly, the following trace equivalence should hold in order to verify that
the voting system model System provides voter anonymity.
System1 \ {| scomm |} ≡T System2 \ {| scomm |}
, where the processes System1 and System2 model two different system behavior:
in the first v1 votes for c1 and v2 for c2, and in the second the voters vote other
way around. Hence, the intruder with the available public information along
with its prior knowledge cannot distinguish these two cases, then we say that
the voting system does not leak any information that may link a voter to her
cast vote. Here, what information is available to the intruder is defined by a set
Ucomms, and also by masking or hiding the information that the intruder is not
supposed to access.
There are numerous kinds of threat scenarios that we can model in this CSP
framework by modifying Ucomms. Here, we present three of those cases, denoted
as DY1, DY2 and DY3.
DY1 : the intruder can observe only the public channels (comm), and not the
channels that should be kept confidential, such as; the channels on which crucial
ballot information and voters’ choice of candidate are transmitted. Hence, we
exclude such information from Ucomms set.
Ucomms = comms \ (comBallots ∪ commCandidates)
DY2 (only 1 honest voter) : the intruder can act as the Dolev-Yao intruder on
all the channels except the voter v1’s communication channels—there exists only
one honest voter and the rest is dishonest.
Ucomms = comms \ ⋃({q.q′. f | q.q′. f ← comms, q← {v1 }, q ′← A},
{q.q′. f | q.q′. f ← comms, q← A, q′← {v1 }})
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DY3 (only 1 dishonest voter) : the intruder can act maliciously only on the
channels of the voter v3, who is collaborating with the intruder, and observe
other public channels—there exist only 1 dishonest and at least 2 honest voters.
Ucomms = ⋃({q.q′. f | q.q′. f ← comms, q← {v3 }, q ′← A},
{q.q′. f | q.q′. f ← comms, q← A, q′← {v3 }})
Our analysis found that STAR-Vote provides anonymity under active in-
truder models: DY1 and DY3, and produced privacy attacks against the system
under DY2, all of which were as expected. (Why? Because when there’s only
one honest voter, the other voters can collude to know the subtotals of their
own votes, and then infer the votes of the remaining honest voter.) To give an
idea about overall verification times for FDR, Table 1 illustrates the verification
times of the automated analysis of STAR-Vote under different intruder capabil-
ities using an average laptop with Intel R© CoreTM i5 CPU 2.40GHz, and 8GB
RAM. The longest run took just under three minutes. This is tolerable, but is
far from ideal in terms of the engineering cycle time of evolving the model.
Table 1. The FDR verification times for STAR-Vote model under different Dolev-Yao
capabilities
DY1 DY2 DY3
Refine States Time Refine States Time Refine States Time
X 128, 101 21s X 26 2m50s X 95, 917 1m39s
We also extended the model with ballot counting mechanism in the wbb
process and measured FDR verification times using the same settings as before.
As illustrated in Table 2, FDR verifies the model for DY1 and DY3 cases, but
not DY2 as FDR crashes once 8GB allocated memory runs out in 45 minutes.
However, we were able to verify the extended model using a better server with
128GB RAM in 2 hours. Furthermore, when extending STAR-Vote CSP model
by including a hash-chain mechanism, which is used in the original system for
integrity purposes, even the server with 128GB crashes before producing a re-
sult. Hence, automated verification of the STAR-Vote CSP model extended with
more components (e.g., pins, hash-chain, and thresholded mechanisms) seems
unrealistic.
Table 2. The FDR verification times for extended STAR-Vote model with counting
mechanism under different Dolev-Yao capabilities. "‘−"’ means that FDR crashes before
producing a result.
DY1 DY2 DY3
Refine States Time Refine States Time Refine States Time
X 1, 201, 525 23m1s − − − X 95, 917 1m51s
8 Murat Moran and Dan S. Wallach
3 STAR-Vote in the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif
We briefly explain our STAR-Vote applied pi model in the followings 2.
3.1 STAR-Vote Model in Applied Pi
Similar to the CSP approach, we modeled the STAR-Vote voting system in the
applied pi calculus by means of processes that intercommunicate, allowing veri-
fication by ProVerif. As with FDR, this process necessarily involves abstracting
away some of the details. Initially, we modeled a set of cryptographic primitives
Σ that are used in STAR-Vote, and it can be defined as the following;
Σ = {ok, pk, hash, sign, dec, penc, zkp, checksign, checkzkp}
Function ok is a constant; pk, hash and checkzkp are unary functions; sign and
dec are binary functions; penc, zkp and checksign are ternary. Accordingly, we
have the following equations:
dec(penc(m, r, pk(sk)), sk) = m (E1)
checksign(sign(sk,m),m, pk(sk)) = ok (E2)
checkzkp(zkp(pk(sk), r,m, penc(m, r, pk(sk)))) = ok (E3)
Equation E1 enables plaintext m to be extracted using the corresponding
secret key sk. E2 allows digital signatures to be verified with an appropriate
public key pk(sk). E3 allows non-interactive zero knowledge proof p to be verified.
For the model, we employ two channel types: public and private. The follow-
ing process V(c, b, v) models a simplified voter process behavior of STAR-Vote in
the applied pi calculus, where v is the candidate of choice, c is a private channel
between the voter and voting terminal, and b is a private channel between the
voter and the ballot box:
V(c, b, v) ::= c¯〈v〉. voter enters her vote
c(v′, bid, bcid, zpi). receives ballot summary and receipt (zpi)
if v = v′ checks if chosen candidate on the ballot
then b¯〈(v, bid, bcid)〉. casts her ballot
Likewise, the rest of the processes that comprise the STAR-Vote model (i.e.
, voting terminal (T), ballot box (B), controller (C) and web bulletin board (W)
processes) are defined in terms of the grammar and equational theory above. The
STAR-Vote pi calculus model Star(ska, skc, v) is then described as the composi-
tion of these processes, and initialized with public-private key pairs (pka, ska) and
(pkc, skc) for election authority and controller respectively. The system then gen-
erates fresh seeds zp0 and zi0, and establishes private channels between trusted
participants before the election as the following.
2 The actual applied pi model is provided at https://muratmoran.com/
publications/ for brevity
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Star(ska, skc, v) ::= let pka = pk(ska) in let pkc = pk(skc) in
ν zp0.ν zi0.
ν chVT .ν chVB .ν chBC .
ν chTC.ν chTW .ν chCW .
(
V(chVT , chVB, v)|
T(chVT , chTC, chTW , pka, pkc, skc, zp0, zi0)|
B(chVB, chBC, pkc, zi0)|
C(chBC, chTC, chCW , pkc, skc)|
W(chCW , chTW , ska, pkc)
)
where ν is the name restriction (i.e., it creates new names).
Modeling Assumptions As in many model checking cases, we abstract away
some of the properties or components of the voting system that are analyzed due
to either state explosion constraints or other limitations of our model checking
tools. The most important of them is the homomorphic tallying of encrypted
votes in STAR-Vote. ProVerif and FDR are both incapable of verifying homo-
morphic encryption. Hence, we consider an election scheme where all encrypted
votes are published on the bulletin board after the election closed, decrypted
individually and counted publicly. The homomorphic tallying ensures that no
single vote is decrypted, thus preserving privacy. Using synchronization points
in the model, we make sure the intruder does not gain any information that
can link encrypted votes with the plaintext equivalence. That is, the wbb waits
until all the votes are decrypted, and then publishes all the plaintext votes. Sec-
ondly, we abstract away hash chain of encrypted votes used in STAR-Vote as
we focus on privacy and not integrity of the election. Lastly, the spoil-audit and
risk-limiting audit mechanisms are not reflected in our model, however voters
will ensure that each paper ballot reflects their intent.
Are these assumptions and simplifications reasonable? Certainly they leave
out security-critical aspects of the STAR-Vote design like the homomorphic tal-
lying. Were an actual election conducted this way, a voter could use their receipt
to prove to a third-party how they voted, and thus enable bribery or coercion
of their vote. Nonetheless, the use of synchronization points presents a reason-
able simulation of the constraints that an adversary might face with regard to
attacking voter privacy, at least under the assumption that voters choose not to
share their receipts. In a real election, a voter must be unable to compromise
their privacy, even if they want to.
Intruder Model Unlike the CSP approach, ProVerif does not need a sepa-
rate implementation of an intruder model. ProVerif instead provides a standard
Dolev-Yao intruder model, having access to all the public channels, and spe-
cial functions to perform a number of malicious actions in order to violate voter
privacy. That is, he can use anything available in the context. By specifying a pri-
vate channel as public we can increase intruder’s capabilities. Similarly, corrupt
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system participants such as voters and voting terminals can be modeled easily
by either giving away their cryptographic keys or by publishing their private
communication channels to the intruder.
3.2 Analysis with ProVerif
Vote-privacy (ballot-secrecy) is defined informally as “no party receives informa-
tion which would allow them to distinguish one situation from another one in
which two voters swap their votes”[13]. Formally, it is defined as:
Definition 1. A voting protocol respects vote-privacy if
S[VA{a/v}|VB{b/v}] ≈l S[VA{b/v}|VB{a/v}]
for all possible votes a and b.
Recently, Blanchet and Smyth [5] have proposed an approach, based on bar-
rier synchronization, to fully automate verification of this definition. It is imple-
mented in the latest version of ProVerif, and supports automated verification
of observational equivalence. Barrier synchronization ensures that ballot-secrecy
holds by swapping outputs of both sides of the observational equivalence. In
order to do that, a compiler first annotates barriers with data to be swapped
and channels for sending and receiving data; the compiler then translates the
biprocesses with annotated barriers into biprocesses without barriers.
We have used these barriers in our model for instance when describing the
wbb process, which receives an individual encrypted vote and decrypts it. Hence,
a synchronization point in between these two events is needed so that the order
of the communication does not leak any information related to that particular
vote. Definition 1 is reflected to ProVerif using a choice operator as:
Star(ska, skc, choice[a, b]) | Star(ska, skc, choice[b, a])
where ska and skc are authority’s and controller’s secret credentials, respectively,
which are fed into the system, and a and b are candidate names.
Having described an abstract model of STAR-Vote, we were able to verify
that our model satisfies the ballot-secrecy property using the ProVerif protocol
verifier. With the same setting as in the CSP approach (the same laptop with
8GB RAM), ProVerif takes around 1.45s in total to verify our pi calculus model
of this complex voting system protocol. ProVerif is also able to find possible
attacks when, for instance, there exists a corrupt voting terminal and a ballot
box by using the compromised information from these entities either by revealing
corresponding secret keys or by making private channels public.
Extending the model in ProVerif is straightforward. We have also managed
to verify two extended versions of this model: first one is extended with pins or
tokens, which are given to voters by the controller for authorization purposes
and then scanned to a voting terminal, and this version is verified in 9.8s; the
second one is extended with hash-chain mechanism, which requires two honest
voter processes and other system participants processes extended for two voters.
ProVerif verifies this extended model in 2.10m using the same laptop.
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4 Evaluation of the Tools: FDR and ProVerif
In this paper, having analyzed STAR-Vote voting system mechanically with
FDR and ProVerif, we now share our experience with these two tools in this
section with respect to expressiveness, usability and efficiency. The tools provide
different approaches to protocol verification and make verification of complex
security protocols easier than hand-proofs, but they may also suffer from the
similar problems such as state explosion. We discuss some of the issues we en-
countered during our analysis in the following categories.
4.1 Expressiveness
We came across several inadequacy of the tools in expressing some of the sys-
tem components, which needed to be abstracted away. For example, neither
FDR nor ProVerif can verify homomorphic tallying, or threshold encryption
and decryption. FDR furthermore cannot verify non-interactive zero knowledge
proofs unlike ProVerif. Similarly, a typical voting system requirement, coercion-
resistance, can be defined in CSP [15], but FDR does not support its mechanical
verification. ProVerif can verify this property but we did not make it a focus of
our verification efforts.
FDR is very expressive in its support for many different kinds of channels:
public or private, blocked or spoofed, all of which can be defined in terms of
functions and sets. ProVerif only supports public and private channels. In prac-
tice, this expressivity is necessary in FDR, which does not provide an adversary
model, while ProVerif provides a Dolev-Yao adversary that does everything we
need.
4.2 Usability
We found modeling and expressing protocol participants more straightforward
with ProVerif than FDR. FDR frequently complains when the network of proto-
cols is too complex to bring together. However they both guide the user well in
finding bugs in the specification. FDR offers a sophisticated user interface, the
ProBE CSP animator, which enables checking if processes behave as intended.
In terms of producing and interpreting counter-examples during the analysis,
ProVerif sometimes produces a trace that leads to the attack when the verifica-
tion does not hold; other times, ProVerif only says that a query does not hold,
and terminates. Moreover, when ProVerif does return a counter-example trace,
the task for the user to interpret the trace and locate why the attack occurs is
often very difficult; we saw some traces that were 3-4 pages long. This also makes
it difficult for a ProVerif user to distinguish whether a trace corresponds to a
legitimate attack, since ProVerif can sometimes return false-positives; this might
seem terrible, but it’s essential to how ProVerif gains its runtime performance.
On the other hand, FDR always produces a counter-example when there should
be one, and tracing back the attack is smooth and straightforward.
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In some cases ProVerif verified our model when it should not have, due to
some minor, unrecognized bugs in our model, for instance; a type mismatching
of functions or creating new names earlier in the model. Hence, it was not sim-
ple to find such bugs during modeling and verification, which may deceive an
inexperienced user into analyzing incorrect model.
Lastly, consider the case of modeling a new voting system, starting from our
existing STAR-Vote models in both FDR and ProVerif. How hard might it be
to derive a new voting system model from our existing one? Code reuse would
certainly be a valuable feature. We note that the ProVerif pi calculus model for
STAR-Vote is around 100 lines of code while the CSP model is around 500 lines
of code. This additional complexity in CSP comes largely from having to specify
sets that are used to describe system participants and the intruder’s behavior.
ProVerif wins for having a generic intruder that we don’t need to specify.
4.3 Efficiency
Verification times vary in FDR depending on the number of participants and
whether the verification holds. We saw runtimes as fast 21 second, and we saw
crashes which occurred after 17 hours, and to even run that long we had to move
to a much larger computer with 128GB RAM. Needless to say, this can make
for a frustrating user experience.
Table 1 displays verification times for FDR for scenarios with 2 or 3 voters,
and Table 2 illustrates verification times for a model extended with pins. When
we add an extra tallying mechanism in the model, the DY1 case increases from
21 seconds to 23 minutes with 10 times more states than before, and in the case
of DY2 with tallying, FDR crashes after 45 minutes, on a laptop with 8GB RAM,
due to lack of memory. We verified this extended version with a bigger server
with 128GB. Additionally, when we extended the model further with hash chain
mechanism FDR crashes even with the larger server after 17 hours. Generally,
the more ability given to intruder, the longer FDR takes to verify. We note that,
to make verification more efficient, FDR3 and FDR4 offer multi-core parallelism
features. Unfortunately, they don’t support testing observational equivalence of
complex models where the left hand side of the equivalence requires more than
10 million states.
We found that ProVerif operates very quickly with models of similar complex-
ity to those we used in FDR. Verification took generally less than two seconds to
complete, allowing us to rapidly iterate on our models. We verified two extended
versions of the model with pins and hash-chain mechanism in 9.8 seconds and
2.10 minutes respectively. Additionally, ProVerif produces generic results i.e. ,
independent of the number of concurrent participants in the protocols unlike
FDR. This means that our ProVerif proofs give us a stronger assurance of the
correctness of our system.
In terms of man-hours, ProVerif can produce false-positive attacks due to its
over-approximation [8]. Hence, dealing with such false positives takes enormous
amount of man-hours and effort. However, FDR does not produce such false
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positives unless an intruder’s power is adjusted improperly, but the user-defined
intruder model requires careful attention and takes a lot of time to integrate.
5 Related Work
To date, there have been a few attempts to compare automated security protocol
verifiers in the literature. C. Meadows [20] compares the approaches followed in
the tools NRL and FDR with the analysis of NSPK, and concludes that two
tools are complementary. Hussain and Seret [16] presents a qualitative compar-
ison between AVISPA and Hermes in terms of their complexity, ease to use and
the conceptional differences between approaches (the comparison is not based on
experiments). It is stated that Hermes is more suited for simple protocols, on the
other hand, AVISPA is better for complex protocols where you would need scala-
bility, flexibility, and precision. Cas J.F. Cremers et al. [11] first discuss the types
of behavior restriction of the models used by the tools; Casper/FDR, ProVerif,
Scyther and AVISPA back-end tools. Then, a performance comparison is made
considering an analysis of secrecy and authentication properties. This is the only
work that compares our chosen tools ProVerif and Casper/FDR 3. However, the
properties that we are dealing with in this paper is not considered since ProVerif
was not able to check observational equivalence properties then. Dalal et al. [12]
compare ProVerif and Scyther tools considering six different security protocols.
The definitions of the models presented in the paper are not language specific,
but pseudocode. Lafourcade et al. [18] analyze a number of protocols dealing
with algebraic properties like Exclusive-Or and Diffie-Hellman and compare the
results from different tools: OFMC, CL-Atse and XOR-ProVerif or DH-ProVerif
in terms of efficiency. The properties that were checked are secrecy, authenti-
cation and also non-repudiation for one e-auction protocol. Cortier et al. [9]
proposed a semi-automatic proof of vote privacy using type-based verification
and the tool rF?, in which security properties and cryptographic functions are
modeled in terms of refinement types. More recently, Lafourcade and Puys [17]
focus on performance analysis of a number of tools including a ProVerif exten-
sion and analysis of 21 cryptographic protocols dealing with Exclusive-Or (xor)
and exponentiation properties like Diffie-Hellman (DH). In the analysis, secrecy
and authentication properties are considered. The tools have been evaluated in
terms of execution time and memory consumption. It is stated that there is not
a clear winner, but more recent tools tend to perform better.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented the first automated privacy verification of the
STAR-Vote voting system along with an evaluation of two protocol verifiers:
FDR and ProVerif. We verified that our STAR-Vote CSP and pi calculus models
3 Casper is a compiler that translates protocol description into the CSP language,
which is then used by FDR.
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provide ballot-privacy, validating our previously informal design and providing
further trustworthiness.
Throughout our analysis we had a chance to evaluate these two security pro-
tocol verifiers with respect to their expressiveness, usability, and effectiveness. In
terms of expressiveness, both tools need further research to pursue in automa-
tion of cryptographic primitives. Regarding usability, FDR offers more with its
inbuilt tools to make sure the model behaves as expected, user interface and
counter-examples, which are easy to interpret and trace back to what causes the
failure. On the other hand, modeling with ProVerif is more straightforward and
requires quite less effort than FDR does. About efficiency, ProVerif is very effi-
cient and quite flexible in modeling and analyzing such complex systems despite
the false-positives, which require a special attention. FDR with lazy spy intruder
model is neither efficient nor scalable when analyzing such complex systems.
Overall, formal verification helps us understand how complex security proto-
cols work and facilitate their analysis. However, it is still expensive in the sense
that it requires a deep understanding of verification tools, experience and a huge
amount of human effort.
Our future work will concentrate on improving the protocol verifiers ProVerif
and FDR by finding techniques that allow us to automatically reason about other
desired properties of e-voting systems such as election verifiability. Moreover, a
formal specification of system mechanisms that were abstracted away in this
paper such as spoil-audit and risk-limiting audit for verifiability purposes can
be pursued as future work.
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